

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 010737
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1. ARAB MEETINGS. ARAB EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A COMMON
FRONT CENTERED ON EGYPT THIS WEEKEND WHERE THE ARAB TIME-
TABLE OF DECISION-MAKING ON THE PEACE PROCESS BECAME
CLEARER. IT APPEARS THAT SADAT'S AIM IS TO CRYSTALLIZE A
COORDINATED ARAB POSITION TOWARD THE NEGOTIATIONS
BY MID-MARCH.

2. IN CAIRO, FOLLOWING A MEETING OF THE ARAB FOREIGN
MINISTERS, TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CHATTY ANNOUNCED
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 010737

THAT THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE WILL MEET ON MARCH 7 IN
CAIRO TO DISCUSS THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE
IN THE GAZA STRIP AND THE WEST BANK. THIS ARAB SUMMIT
WOULD ALSO ESTABLISH A JOINT STRATEGY TO SOLVE THE MIDDLE
EAST CRISIS.

3. THE MARCH 7 DATE APPEARS DESIGNED TO PRESSURE THE
PALESTINIANS TO FORMULATE AT THE FEBRUARY PALESTINE
NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) MEETING A PALESTINIAN PEACE STRATE-
GY IN ORDER TO ATTAIN A CONSENSUS ON KEY QUESTIONS. THESE

INCLUDE PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA; FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE; ACCEPTANCE OF A WEST BANK/GAZA STATE; AND RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL.

4. IN A STATEMENT GEARED TO NUDGE THE PALESTINIANS TO MAKE THESE DIFFICULT CHOICES, CHATTY EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO DECIDE ON "WHAT EXACTLY THEY WANT." HE NOTED THAT THE PALESTINIANS MUST AGREE ON A DEFINITE POLICY SO THAT THE ARAB STATES CAN DETERMINE THE BEST WAY OF HELPING THEM. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

5. EGYPT-JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT SADAT ALSO PUSHED THE PALESTINIANS TO ACCEPT A MORE MODERATE UNITED POSITION. IN A JOINT STATEMENT FOLLOWING THEIR THREE-DAYS OF MEETINGS IN ASWAN THE TWO HEADS OF STATE SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND THAT THE PLO SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT GENEVA ON THE SAME FOOTING AS ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

6. THE STATEMENT ALSO NOTED THAT HUSSEIN WELCOMED AN EARLIER PROPOSAL BY SADAT FOR A FORMAL LINK BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND JORDAN. THE KING MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A LINK SHOULD BE FREELY DECIDED UPON BY THE PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN PEOPLE. (THE PALESTINIANS HAVE YET TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF LINKAGE.)

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 010737

7. THE EGYPTIAN VIEW ON THE FORMAL JORDANIAN LINK WITH A PALESTINIAN STATE WAS RELATED TO EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CAIRO. ACCORDING TO AN AIDE OF FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY, SADAT BELIEVES THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS RECOGNIZE THAT A WEST BANK/GAZA STATE, IF IT IS TO BE VIABLE, MUST HAVE A FORMAL LINK WITH JORDAN. THE OFFICIAL NOTED THAT THOUGH IT HAD BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE HUSSEIN, THE KING HAD FINALLY AGREED TO ACCEPT THE NOTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIAN STATE FOR FORMAL LINKAGE. THE EGYPTIANS ALSO BELIEVE THAT TIES BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD OVERCOME ISRAELI OBJECTIONS TO A THIRD STATE BETWEEN THE SEA AND THE DESERT. IF SADAT HOPES TO SELL THIS IDEA TO THE ISRAELIS, A FORMAL LINE BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS WOULD HAVE TO ESTABLISHED PRIOR TO GENEVA CONFERENCE. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. ISRAEL. RABIN IS FACING ANOTHER PFLA, ARL LHAATY IN HIS CAMPAIGN. FOR REELECTION (AND FOR PARTY HEAD WITH THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATION OF FINANCE MINISTER RABINOWITZ IN THE ONGOING SCANDAL INVOLVING THE ALLEGED CHANNELING OF SHIKUN OVDIM (HISTADRUT'S CONSTRUCTION COMPANY) FUNDS TO THE LABOR PARTY. KNESSET MEMBER YORAN ARIDOR--THE HEAD OF THE LIKUD FACTION IN THE HISTADRUT

CLAIMED LATE LAST WEEK THAT THE POLICE WERE INVESTIGATING CHARGES THAT THE FUNDS HAD BEEN ILLEGALLY TRANSFERRED TO THE LABOR PARTY'S TEL AVIV OFFICE AT A TIME WHEN RABINOWITZ WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PARTY'S FINANCES IN TEL AVIV. EMBASSY TEL AVIV COMMENTED THAT RABINOWITZ'S POSSIBLE IMPLICATION COULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE LABOR PARTY, SINCE HE IS ONE OF LABOR'S "BIG FOUR" CABINET MINISTERS AND A MEMBER OF THE PARTY'S INNER CIRCLE.

9. MEANWHILE, YIGAL YADIN'S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR CHANGE (DMC) HAS RECEIVED A BOOST WITH THE JANUARY 13 DECISION OF THE FREE CENTER PARTY TO MERGE WITH IT.
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 010737

THE FREE CENTER PARTY BOLTED FROM THE LIKUD FACTION LAST OCTOBER. IN THE SHORT TERM, THE FREE CENTER PARTY WILL LOSE BY RESIGNING ITS TWO KNESSET SEATS (WHICH REVERT TO THE LIKUD) BUT HOPES TO BETTER ITS PROSPECTS FOR THE MAY ELECTION WHERE POLLS SHOWED IT WOULD HAVE FAILED TO WIN ANY SEATS. EMBASSY TEL AVIV COMMENTED THAT IT IS NOW INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT THE DMC MAY BECOME A PARTNER IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT AFTER THE MAY ELECTIONS.

10. EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTED THAT BOTH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS AND FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERLY HAVE CONFIRMED TO EMBASSY OFFICERS THAT IT IS THEIR INTENTION TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE DISPUTE OVER THE ABU DAOUD CAUSE NO LASTING HARM TO FRANCO-ISARELI RELATTONS. NEVERTHELESS, SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL EVRON COMMENTED THAT THE TENDENCY WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS TO ASK THAT FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER GUIRINGAUD POSTPONE HIS SCHEDULED FEBRUARY VISIT TO ISRAEL. THE PROPOSED VISITS OF OTHER FRENCH CABINET MINISTERS WOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE PUT OFF, IF NOT SCRUBBED. (CONFIDENTIAL)

11. TERRORISTS. THE PLO OFFICE IN ALGIERS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ABU DAOUD HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO FACE TRIAL IN WEST GERMANY ON THE ALLEGATIONS THAT HE HELPED MASTERMIND THE MUNICH OLYMPICS INCIDENT. HOWEVER, ABU DAOUD REPORTEDLY SPECIFIED CERTAIN CONDITIONS FOR THIS, ONE OF WHICH WAS THAT EVIDENCE OF HIS INVOLVEMENT NOT COME FROM "ZIONIST ORGANIZATIONS OR THE CIA". (UNCLASSIFIED)

12. FATAH'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, ACCORDING TO AN UNTESTED CLANDESTINE SOURCE, HAD LEARNED THAT WADI HADDAD, LEADER OF THE PFLP REJECTIONISTS, IS PLANNING TO HIJACK AN ARAB AIRCRAFT IN NICOSIA OR ATHENS TO PROTEST RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS. THE "BLACK JUNE" REJECTIONIST
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 010737

GROUP IS ALSO PLANNING TO HIJACK AIRCRAFT OF ANY ARAB STATE THAT PARTICIPATES IN THE GENEVA MEETINGS. THE SOURCE STATED THAT FATAH WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO PREVENT THESE HIJACKINGS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT "CARLOS" WAS IN LIBYA AS OF JANUARY 8. (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)

13. LEBANON. THE ISSUE OF HEAVY WEAPONS COLLECTION CONTINUES TO DOMINATE THE SCENE. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE SYRIAN FORCES OF THE ASF HAVE BEGUN THE ARMS SWEEP MENTIONED EARLIER BY CHIEF OF STAFF SHIHABI, THE SYRIAN PRESS APPEARS TO BE PREPARING PUBLIC OPINION FOR SUCH A MOVE. THE SYRIAN DAILY AL THAWRA EDITORIALIZED YESTERDAY THAT "ONE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THE ASF STARTS SOON TO ASSAULT THE PLACES WHERE HEAVY WEAPONS ARE HIDDEN TO CONFISCATE THEM". (CONFIDENTIAL)

14. EGYPT-FRANCE. THE FRENCH MINISTERIAL DELEGATE FOR ARMAMENTS HAS PRIVATELY DENIED PRESS REPORTS THAT FRANCE SOLD 200 MIRAGE F-1 FIGHTERS TO EGYPT AND ITS PARTNERS IN AN ARMS PRODUCTION CONSORTIUM-SAUDI ARABIA, QATAR AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. PARIS HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING FOR OVER A YEAR WITH EGYPT AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ARAB ORGANIZATION FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION (AOI) ON A FIGHTER DEAL THAT WOULD INVOLVE THE DELIVERY OF A SMALL NUMBER OF MIRAGES THIS YEAR, WITH THE REMAINDER TO BE ASSEMBLED IN EGYPT LATER. WE DO NOT KNOW THE EXACT STATUS OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER BOURGES PROMISED DURING A RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO TO PROVIDE FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN SETTING UP AN ARAB ARMS INDUSTRY.

15. BOTH THE FRENCH AND THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE A FIGHTER AGREEMENT, BUT THERE ARE MANY HURDLES TO OVERCOME. THE EGYPTIANS WANT TO BUILD FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN EGYPT BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DECIDE WHICH AIRCRAFT THEY PREFER. THE MIRAGE F-1 IS MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED, BUT THE FRENCH-WEST GERMAN ALPHA JET ANRATON. SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 010737

THE BRITISH HAWK ARE EVIDENTLY STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. BOTH WOULD BE CHEAPER AND EASIER TO BUILD THAN THE MIRAGE BUT ARE LESS EFFECTIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT.

16. FRANCE'S DASSAULT AIRCRAFT-DESIGN FIRM WOULD RATHER SELL FIGHTER PLANES OUTRIGHT THAN BECOME INVOLVED IN LONG-TERM MANUFACTURING PROGRAMS IN AN UNSTABLE REGION. DASSAULT AND OTHER FRENCH FIRMS CONNECTED WITH THE PROGRAM FEAR ULTIMATE NATIONALIZATION OF FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY, AND THEY QUESTION THE PERMANENCE OF THE AOI AS A SOURCE OF FUNDS. THEY ALSO ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT FINDING TECHNICIANS IN

THEIR COMPANIES WILLING TO WORK IN EGYPT.

17. DASSAULT AND OTHER FIRMS HAVE AGREED NEVERTHELESS TO GIVE THE AOI ASSEMBLY RIGHTS FOR A FRENCH FIGHTER IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE A DEAL, PROVIDED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES THEIR INVESTMENTS. PARIS THUS FAR HAS BALKED AT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

18. THE SUCCESS OF AN ASSEMBLY OR MANUFACTURING PROJECT WOULD ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON THE CONSERVATIVE OIL STATES' WILLINGNESS TO FINANCE EGYPT'S AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY. THE COST OF BUILDING THE AIRCRAFT IN EGYPT WOULD BE HIGHER THAN IF THEY WERE PRODUCED IN FRANCE. THE AOI WAS FORMED TO REDUCE ARAB DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ARMS SUPPLIERS, AND MEMBER STATES REALIZE THEY WILL HAVE TO PAY A PREMIUM FOR PRODUCTION RIGHTS AND THE ACCOMPANYING TECHNOLOGY.

19. EGYPTIAN PRODUCTION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SUCH AS FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT REDUCE ARAB DEPENDENCE ON WESTERN EUROPE FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS, WHICH THE ARAB INDUSTRIES ARE INCAPABLE OF MANUFACTURING. SAUDI ARABIA, QATAR, AND THE UAE MUST ALSO REALIZE THAT ALTHOUGH THE EGYPTIANS WILL BE ABLE TO ASSEMBLE FIGHTERS FROM
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 010737

IMPORTED PARTS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ACTUAL PRODUCTION REMAINS A DISTANT GOAL. MOREOVER, ASSEMBLY IN EGYPT WILL BE AT SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER RATES, AND AIRCRAFT COULD BE OBTAINED FASTER BY OUTRIGHT PURCHASE FROM EUROPE.

20. SAUDI ARABIA, QATAR, AND THE UAE MAY ULTIMATELY DECIDE TO BUY AIRCRAFT TO REBUILD THE DWINDLING EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT INVENTORY AS WELL AS TO REPLENISH THEIR OWN INVENTORIES WHILE THE AOI CONCENTRATES INITIALLY ON PRODUCING SIMPLER WEAPONS SYSTEMS REQUIRING LESS TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERTISE. (SECRET/NOFORN)

21. EGYPT-USSR. CAIRO MENA REPORTED ON JANUARY 15 THAT A SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION HEADED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER GRISHIN WILL ARRIVE IN CAIRO JANUARY 25 FOR TALKS LEADING TO SIGNING A 1977 TRADE AGREEMENT. THIS IS A RESCHEDULING OF A VISIT ORIGINALLY SLATED TO TAKE PLACE IN MID-DECEMBER. (UNCLASSIFIED)

22. EGYPT-SUDAN. THE TWO COUNTRIES SIGNED A JOINT DEFENSE ACCORD IN CAIRO ON JANUARY 15 AND, ACCORDING TO A JOINT STATEMENT, AGREED ON "MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO FACE ANY SUBVERSIVE MOVE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. EGYPT ALSO REAFFIRMED ITS DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT SUDAN AGAINST ANY SUBVERSIVE ACTS CARRIED OUT AGAINST IT. AGREEMENT FOR A DEFENSE PACT WAS ORIGINALLY REACHED LAST

JULY, WHEN BOTH COUNTRIES WERE BEING CHALLENGED BY LIBYA. SINCE THEN, SUDAN AND ETHIOPIA HAVE ENGAGED IN A MINI-WAR OF WORDS, WITH KHARTOUM ACCUSING ITS NEIGHBOR OF TRAINING MERCENARIES TO UNDERMINE SUDAN'S SECURITY. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

23. SYRIA. A RECENT REPORT FROM THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE IN TEL AVIV STATES THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE NOW HAS INFORMATION FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE DESCRIBED
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 010737

BY THE ISRAELIS AS VERY GOOD, THAT THE SYRIAN ORDER TO THE SOVIETS TO LEAVE TARTUS, SYRIA, HAS BEEN CANCELLED. THE BACKGROUND OF THE REPORTED CANCELLATION IS NOT KNOWN, NOR IS THERE ANY INFORMATION AS TO ANY POSSIBLE GAINS THE SYRIANS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE REPORTED CANCELLATION.

24. ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL REQUEST WAS INTENDED AS A "MESSAGE" TO MOSCOW IN RETALIATION FOR A CUTBACK IN SOVIET MILITARY WEAPONS DELIVERIES SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE LAST OCTOBER, BUT DELAYED UNTIL DECEMBER. WHEN THE EQUIPMENT FINALLY DID ARRIVE. IT INCLUDED TANKS AND MISSILES. HOWEVER, THE DELIVERY WAS ONLY 30 PERCENT OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON. DAMASCUS THEREFORE DECIDED TO EVIDENCE ITS DISPLEASURE BY CURTAILING SOVIET PORT FACILITIES AT TARTUS. (SECRET/NOFORN)

25. IRAQ. IRAQ OPENED A NEW PIPELINE THROUGH TURKEY THIS MONTH, AND WILL NOW BE ABLE TO EXPORT OIL FROM MEDITERRANEAN PORTS FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE PIPELINE THROUGH SYRIA WAS CLOSED LAST APRIL. THE 1,000-KILOMETER PIPELINE HAS A CAPACITY OF 700,000 BARRELS PER DAY, ABOUT 500,000 BARRELS LESS THAN THE LINE THROUGH SYRIA.

26. THE NEW PIPELINE WILL ALLOW IRAQ TO PUMP MORE THAN HALF OF THE PRODUCTION FROM ITS NORTHERN FIELDS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. IRAQ PREVIOUSLY CHanneled ALL OF ITS PRODUCTION FROM THESE FIELDS THROUGH SYRIA BUT HALTED SHIPMENTS WHEN A DISPUTE WITH SYRIA ON PRICES AND TRANSIT FEES LED TO THE CLOSURE OF THE PIPELINE THROUGH SYRIA. EXPORTS SUBSEQUENTLY WERE RESUMED AT A REDUCED LEVEL WITH THE OPENING OF A PIPELINE LINKING KIRKUK WITH THE PERSIAN GULF.

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 010737

27. THE PIPELINE THROUGH TURKEY WILL GIVE IRAQ GREATER

FLEXIBILITY IN CHOOSING EXPORT MARKETS AND METHODS OF DELIVERY. IT WILL ALSO INCREASE IRAQ'S EXPORT CAPABILITY, SINCE THE DOMESTIC NORTH-SOUTH PIPELINE CANNOT HANDLE ALL THE PRODUCTION FROM THE NORTHERN FIELDS.

28. IRAQ UNDOUBTEDLY WILL USE THE NEW EXPORT SITUATION TO MAKE UP FOR ITS CURRENT RELUCTANCE TO COMPETE WITH THE LOWER PRICED SAUDI CRUDE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. SINCE NO PREVIOUS PRICES HAVE BEEN SET FOR CRUDE SHIPPED THROUGH TURKISH PORTS, IRAQ WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOWER PRICES WITHOUT OPENLY BREACHING ITS SUPPORT OF THE RECENT 10-PERCENT OPEC PRICE HIKE. SOME LOWERING OF PRICES WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY TO UTILIZE THE NEW PIPELINE AT FULL CAPACITY. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

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